UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1.	OCCURRED	8.	CAUSE: EQUIPMENT FAILURE			
	DATE: 20-FEB-2005 TIME: 1100 HOURS		X HUMAN ERROR			
2	OPERATOR: Dominion Exploration &		EXTERNAL DAMAGE			
۷.	OPERATOR: Dominion Exploration & Production, Inc.		SLIP/TRIP/FALL			
			WEATHER RELATED			
	REPRESENTATIVE: Steven P. Tuttle		LEAK			
	TELEPHONE: (504) 593-7193 LEASE: G16647 AREA: MC LATITUDE:		UPSET H2O TREATING			
3.			OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID			
			OTHER			
	BLOCK: 772 LONGITUDE:	9.	WATER DEPTH: 5413 FT.			
Λ	PLATFORM:	10.	DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 70 MI.			
.			WIND DIRECTION: S			
	RIG NAME T.O. CAJUN EXPRESS		SPEED: 17 M.P.H.			
5.	ACTIVITY: X EXPLORATION (POE)	12.	CURRENT DIRECTION: SSE			
	DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION		SPEED: 15 M.P.H.			
	(DOCD/POD)	13.	SEA STATE: 4 FT.			
6.	TYPE: FIRE	,				
	EXPLOSION					
	COLLISION					
			OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE/ SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:			
	X INJURY NO. 1		Bobby Oegal			
	FATALITY NO. 0 POLLUTION OTHER		CITY: Houma STATE: LA			
			TELEPHONE: (504) 595-5205			
7.	OPERATION: PRODUCTION		CONTRACTOR: Transocean Offshore			
	X DRILLING					
	WORKOVER COMPLETION MOTOR VESSEL		CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/ SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:			
			Bobby Henry			
			CITY: Houma STATE: LA			
	PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.		TELEPHONE: (504) 595-5206			
	OTHER					

MMS - FORM 2010 PAGE: 1 OF 4

EV2010R * * * * * * * PROPRIETARY * * * * * * 19-APR-2005

17. DESCRIBE IN SEQUENCE HOW ACCIDENT HAPPENED:

A contract employee injured his hand while attempting to unclog a 6" vacuum hose. The hose had become clogged while the crane crew was not available to change out the cuttings box that was full. When the employee released the cam lock and pulled to release the hose, the weight of the hose, which was clogged with mud and cuttings, was too much for the employee, and it fell against a pipe with his hand under it. The resulting injury was a broken index finger with damaged tendon, and a severely bruised and cut thumb.

Findings:

No JSA was prepared by the employee or by the safety man on rig. Also, the overall job could have been planned better by allowing for the use of a chain hoist that is engineered for these types of jobs. This equipment is designed so that one technician can control the process of filling and changing out cutting boxes without the need for relying on the Crane Crew to be focused on the "O Discharge" system at all time to change out full boxes or risk having the system back up. Finally, although this equipment was not used on this job, there was no pre-job coordination with the rig officials regarding an assignment of additional personnel to assist in handling common situations like the clogging vacuum line.

There was a lack of communication and coordination with the representatives of the Drilling Contactor or Operator, regarding the designation of assistance for one man crew if needed.

The employee did not follow correct procedures for dealing with clogged hosed and tried to correct the problem without getting help.

- 18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:
 - 1) Lack of Pre-job planning
 - 2) Lack of communication
 - 3) Procedures not followed
- 19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

n/a

MMS - FORM 2010 PAGE: 2 OF 4

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

n/a

n/a

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

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22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

No Recommendations to MMS

The New Orleans District concurs with Dominion and Transocean recommendations to prevent a recurrence as stated below.

- 1) Reinforce JSA process by providing refresher training for employees on proper hazard analysis, correct preparation of JSA's, and presenting the JSA to rig officials in order to coordinate recommendations or action items.
- 2) The equipment described above should always be recommended by our Operations Staff, and whenever possible should be used to help ensure that the job is performed safely and efficiently. Otherwise, we will request the deployment of two of our service hands per shift on all similar jobs in the future unless the rig can provide reliable assistance when it is needed.
- 3) Address the behavioral safety issues that led to the employee not following the correct job procedures regarding changing out hoses. Specifically, on the abandoning safe work practices in order to keep the job going.
- 23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: NO
- 24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:
- 25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

28-FEB-2005

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

Stephen Lucky /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Troy Trosclair

APPROVED

DATE: 12-APR-2005

MMS - FORM 2010 PAGE: 3 OF 4

EV2010R * * * * * * PROPRIETARY * * * * * 19-APR-2005

INJURY/FATALITY/WITNESS ATTACHMENT

	PRESENTATIVE REPRESENTATIVE	x	INJURY FATALIT	Y
OTHER	(CFRESHIATIVE		WITNESS	
, man a man				
EMPLOYED BY:	Transocean Offshore	20863		
CITY: ZIP CODE:	Houston		STATE:	TX
ZIF CODE.				

PAGE: 4 OF 4 MMS - FORM 2010 19-APR-2005

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